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Abstract 
This paper explores the institutional dimension of the implementation of the new generation 
EU Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) from a fundamental rights perspective. The creation of an 
institutional architecture of EU FTAs is what makes them operational. It enables the other 
dimensions to become “alive” and not to remain words within a text. Given the plethora of 
entities created by the new generation of EU FTAs, this paper investigates the extent to which 
the institutional architecture of EU FTAs is adequate to protect and promote fundamental 
rights. This investigation shows that, despite significant novelties, several limitations remain. 
Gaps in the mandate and deficiencies in the decision-making processes lead to foresee little 
consideration of fundamental rights at the implementation stage. 
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Introduction  
The creation of an institutional framework for the implementation of EU Free Trade 
Agreements (FTAs) is what makes them operational. It enables the other dimensions to 
become “alive” and not to remain words within a text. The institutional governance of the new 
generation of EU FTAs has been said to have “widened and deepened”.1 New entities created 
by EU FTAs have been delegated substantive decision-making powers, and their influence 
expanded into policy areas traditionally the prerogative of States. What kind of institutions 
these are, how they work and their implications for the protection of fundamental rights, are all 
questions that have been largely neglected by the literature on EU external trade.2 Institutions 
have been the focus of literature on international relations, sociology and organisational 
studies, while legal accounts have been limited to legalisation, compliance and enforcement 
issues. This paper wants to provide a different account: it conducts an analysis of the legal 
framework of the institutional architecture of EU FTAs and engages in normative explorations 
of its relationship with fundamental rights. 
Institutions are interpreted here broadly as encompassing bodies set up by rules which will 
form expectations with an impact on human behaviour and political action.3 Institutions are 
considered to produce “living agreements” that can endure and give rise to a new legal order, 
by way of legal outputs and exchanges arising from institutionalised practices and 
cooperation.4 Following this understanding, the paper considers the significance of the 
plethora of new entities created by the new generation EU FTAs. From a fundamental rights 
perspective, their significance lies on two extremities. On the one hand, the literature attaches 
a series of advantages to institutions: from assuaging uncertainty and concerns of delegation 
of authority;5 to prompting positive practices of transparency6 and enabling forums for sharing 
information and linking issues together.7 On the other hand, the literature on democratisation 
beyond the State typically stresses legitimacy deficits of institutions operating beyond the 
State. In the context of trade, research has shown that concerns over fundamental rights may 
be kept at bay.8 In light of these trade-offs, the paper asks: to what extent is the institutional 
architecture for the implementation of EU FTAs adequate to protect fundamental rights?  
                                               
1 Lore Van Den Putte and Jan Orbie, ‘EU Bilateral Trade Agreements and the Surprising Rise of Labour Provisions’ (2015) 31 
International Journal of Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations 263, 269. 
2 Some exceptions include i.a. ibid, Wolfgang Weiss, ‘Delegation to treaty bodies in EU agreements: constitutional constraints 
and proposals for strengthening the European Parliament' (2018) 14 European Constitutional Law Review 532; and Emanuel 
Castellarin, ‘The joint committees established by free trade agreements and their impact on EU law’, in Isabelle Bosse-Platière 
and Cécile Rapoport, The Conclusion and Implementation of EU Free Trade Agreements: Constitutional Challenges (Edward 
Elgar 2019). 
3 Simon Bulmer, ‘New institutionalism and the governance of the Single European Market’ (1998) 5 Journal of European Public 
Policy 365, 368. 
4 Marija Bartl, ‘Making transnational markets: the institutional politics behind the TTIP’ (2016) Amsterdam Law School Research 
Paper No. 2016-64, 2. 
5 Michael Zürn, ‘The politicization of world politics and its effects: Eight propositions ’ (2014) 6 European Political Science 
Review 47. 
6 Vigjilenca Abazi, ‘Transparency in the Institutionalisation of Transatlantic Relations: Dynamics of Official Secrets and Access 
to Information in Security and Trade’ in Elaine Fahey (ed), Institutionalisation Beyond the Nation State: Transatlantic Relations: 
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To answer this question, the following sub-questions are addressed: does this institutional 
architecture take into account fundamental rights? How does it differ across trade partners? 
What are its limitations? What could be improved to make it better equipped to deal with 
fundamental rights? According to Keohane, strengthening institutions so that they reflect 
legitimate social purposes is a major challenge for our time9 and “an adequate judgment of 
their worth depends on an estimate of the contribution they are likely to make, in the future, to 
the solution of problems that cannot yet be precisely defined.”10 This paper explores the 
contribution of the EU institutional architecture of the new generation of EU FTAs to 
fundamental rights. It first relies on theoretical insights to explain how institutions matter for 
fundamental rights (Section 2). Taking as case studies the EU trade initiatives with Canada 
(CETA), the US (TTIP), Singapore (ESUFTA) and Japan (EUJEPA),11 the chapter sheds light 
on major shortcomings in the mandate of treaty bodies and in internal processes of decision-
making from a fundamental rights perspective (Section 3Finally, whilst not longing for the 
perfect model, this paper advances a series of considerations for an institutional architecture 
of EU FTAs that would adequately protect fundamental rights (Section 4). 
 
2. Between Old and New Treaty Bodies of EU FTAs 
The institutional architecture of EU FTAs includes, above all, the treaty bodies set out under 
the specific institutional chapters; but also other entities envisaged in the FTA, yet outside the 
institutional chapters. All the FTAs under investigation feature institutional chapters: they 
create and elaborate on the duties of a Joint Committee and also establish Specialised 
committees. The institutional chapters also often envisage the setting up of working groups 
and contact points, which are not examined here. With the only exception of TTIP,12 
institutional chapters do not include recently-introduced entities that institutionalise civil society 
in the institutional architecture of EU FTAs: the Civil Society Forum and the Domestic Advisory 
Groups. These are part of the chapters on trade and sustainable development (TSD).13 In this 
overview, EUSFTA emerges as the most atypical FTA: it does not establish a Specialised 
committee on TSD, but a Board; nor does it foresee the creation of a committee on regulatory 
                                               
Data, Privacy and Trade Law (Springer 2018). 
7 Andrew Moravcsik, ‘Robert Keohane: Political Theorist’ in Helen Milner and Andrew Moravcsik (eds), Power, 
Interdependence, and Nonstate Actors in World Politics (Princeton University Press 2009) 254. 
8 Marcilio Toscano Franca-Filho and others, ‘Protection of Fundamental Rights in Latin American FTAs and MERCOSUR: An 
Exploratory Agenda’ (2014) 20 European Law Journal 811, 822-823. 
9 Robert O Keohane, ‘Twenty Years of Institutional Liberalism’ (2012) 26 International Relations 125. 
10 Robert O Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton University Press 
1984) 247. 
11 The paper is part of a PhD research and relies on the same case studies: these are Post-Lisbon new generation trade 
agreements that the EU has negotiated with advanced economies in North America and Asia. 
12 European Union’s proposal for a legal text on Institutional, General and Final Provisions in TTIP, tabled for discussion with 
the US in the negotiating round of 11-15 July 2016 and made public on 14 July 2016 (hereafter TTIP). 
13 CETA is only a partial exception to that, in that the provisions on the domestic advisory groups are to be found under the 
chapter on trade and labour and the chapter on trade and environment. 
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cooperation, chiefly because there is no chapter on that. EUSFTA is also the only agreement 
not envisaging a Civil Society Forum. 
 
Table No.1: Overview of the institutional architecture per trade agreement.14 
 
Joint Committees and Specialised Committees 
Joint and Specialised committees are a typical feature of EU international agreements. It is 
not surprising, therefore, that all the EU FTAs under investigation envisage the creation of a 
Joint Committee and a number of Specialised Committees.15  The Joint Committees are 
executive bodies formed by representatives of the EU and of the trade partner.16 They are co-
chaired by the EU Commissioner for Trade and the partner’s Minister for Trade.17 Their main 
function is to supervise and facilitate the implementation and operation of the entire 
agreement. 18 Above all, they are the main decisional bodies within the institutional architecture 
of EU FTAs. The Specialised Committees are responsible for monitoring the implementation 
of specific individual chapters. Just like the Joint Committees, they are intergovernmental 
                                               
14 Source: compilation of the author based on treaty provisions. Joint Committees: Art.26.1 CETA; Art.X.1 TTIP; Art.16.1 
EUSFTA (this is in fact a “Trade Committee”. A Joint Committee is established under the PCA, 16.1(5) FTA referring to Art.41 
PCA); Art.22.1 EUJEPA. Specialised Committees: Art.26.2 CETA; Art.X.3 TTIP; Art.16.2 EUSFTA; Art.22.3 EUJEPA; TSD 
Committees: Art.26.2.1(g) CETA; Art.X.3(c) TTIP (yet missing elaboration in the specific TSD chapter); Art.12.15 EUSFTA 
(Board on TSD); Art.23.3(1)(h) EUJEPA. Working Groups: Art.X.3 TTIP; Art.22.4 EUJEPA. For CETA, a slight exception is 
Art.5.14(4) The Joint Management Committee [for Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures] may establish working groups 
comprising expert level representatives of the Parties, to address specific SPS issues. Contact Points: Art.26.5 CETA; Art.X.5 
TTIP; Art.22.6 EUJEPA. Domestic Advisory Groups: Articles 23.8(4) 24.13(5) CETA; Art.X.7 TTIP; Art.12.15(5) EUSFTA; 
Art.16.15 EUJEPA. Civil Society Forum: Art.22.5 CETA; Art.X.8 TTIP; Art.16.16 EUJEPA. 
15 EUSFTA in fact establishes a Trade Committee, which is nonetheless comparable to the Joint Committees of the other FTAs. 
A Joint Committee is envisaged under its political counterpart, the EU-Singapore Partnership and Cooperation Agreement 
(PCA). 
16 Art.26.1(1) CETA, Art.X.1(1) TTIP, Art.16.1(1) EUSFTA, Art.22.1(1) EUJEPA.  
17 Art.26.1(1) CETA, Art.X.1(a) TTIP, Art.16.1(2) EUSFTA, Art.22.1(3) EUJEPA. 
18 See e.g. Art.26.3 CETA; Art.22.1(4) and 22.1(5) EUJEPA; Art.16.1(3)(a) EUSFTA. In TTIP, the Joint Committee would have 
also had specific duties in relation to regulatory cooperation. 
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executive bodies composed of representatives of the Parties.19 They can be expected to work 
towards the achievement of the objectives of the chapters under their responsibility, where 
their functions are also specified. Whilst mainly reporting to the Joint Committee, and 
proposing draft decisions to it, the texts of EUSFTA, CETA and EUJEPA lead to believe that 
they can also take decisions themselves.20  
 
Table No.2: Selected decision-making powers of the Joint Committee per trade agreement.21 
 
 
Table No.3: Selected decision-making powers of Specialised Committees and their relationship with the Joint 
Committee.22 
                                               
19 See i.a. Art.26.2(4) and Art.22.4(1) CETA; Art. 16.2(3), Art.2.15(1), Art.5.15 EUSFTA; Art.22.3(3)(b) EUJEPA. 
20 See Art.26.2(4) CETA and Art.22.3(5) EUJEPA. As regards TTIP, nothing is mentioned about the possibility for specialised 
committees to adopt decisions. It could be inferred that decision-making would remain a prerogative of the Joint Committee, 
without yet excluding the possibility for it to allocate new tasks and powers to the specialised committees. The wording in 
EUSFTA is unclear as to whether the specialised committees can take decisions themselves, or if it is the Parties who take 
decisions in the specialised committees, see Art.16.4(1) EUSFTA. Yet a series of other provisions lead to believe that 
specialised committees such as Committee on Trade in Goods would have similar powers. 
21 Source: compilation of the author based on treaty provisions. On TTIP, the power to dissolve only relates to the Specialised 
Committees that would be established by the Joint Committee and not the FTA per se. 
22 Source: compilation of the author based on treaty provisions. 
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The DAGs and the Civil Society Forum  
The new generation EU FTAs for the first time encompass a prominent civil society dimension 
in their institutional structure. The newly-created bodies for civil society reflect a renewed effort 
to involve it beyond the negotiation stage. Two main bodies stand out which increasingly 
institutionalise the participation of civil society at the implementation level: the Domestic 
Advisory Groups (DAGs), one to be created domestically by each trade partner; and the Civil 
Society Forum (CSF), working at the bilateral level.  
The DAGs are a unique and novel feature of the Post-Lisbon trade agreements. All the FTAs 
under investigation mandate each Party to convene or establish their own new domestic 
advisory group, or to consult an already existing one.23 At the moment of writing, the EU and 
the respective trade partners have established the DAGs for CETA and EUJEPA, but not for 
EUSFTA.24 The DAGs consist of a small number of civil society representatives and 
permanent observers.25 With the exception of EUJEPA, all the other FTAs stipulate that there 
shall be a “balanced representation” including business, social and environmental 
stakeholders.26 The EU DAGs comprise members representing three groups: representatives 
of the employers, of the workers, and the so-called “third interests”.27 Regarding the selection 
process, it is the Commission that publishes the call for expression of interest and takes the 
final decision on the basis of a number of criteria.28  
While the EU DAGs are administered by the European Economic and Social Committee and 
to work independently from the Commission, the Rules of Procedure of the EU DAGs of both 
CETA and EUJEPA provide that the EU Commission is to be systematically invited to 
participate in the EU DAGs meetings.29 Regarding the DAGs of trade partners, Canada has 
decided to have one DAG for labour, and one DAG on environment. Unlike for the Canadian 
DAG on environment,30 at the time of writing there is no record of the establishment of the 
DAG for labour. It is uncertain whom it encompasses, beyond those that were mentioned at 
the Civil Society Forum on 12 September 201831 and at the CSF in November 2019.32 Japan 
has followed Canada’s approach in having two different DAGs. The DAG for labour comprises 
the Labour Policy Council,33 which is an advisory body of the Ministry of Health, Labour and 
Welfare: albeit composed of representatives of the workers, of the employers and of public 
interest, its members are appointed by the Ministry.34  
                                               
23 In general, provisions on the DAGs are to be found in the TSD chapters, under the heading of institutional mechanisms. 
EUSFTA and EUJEPA reflect this practice, whereas CETA is slightly different, due to the Canadian preference to have two 
separate DAGs: one for the chapter on Trade and Labour and one for the chapter on Trade and the Environment, and which 
are thus established therein. TTIP would have differed more significantly, inasmuch as it would have established the DAGs 
under the overarching institutional chapter. This way, it would have recognised them a constitutive part of the institutional 
architecture of the Agreement. As shown below, this would have also been reflected in the scope of their mandate. See Articles 
23.8(4) and 24.13(5) CETA - Institutional mechanisms; Art.X.7 TTIP - Domestic Advisory Groups; Art.12.15 EUSFTA - 
Institutional Set up; Art.16.15 EUJEPA - Domestic advisory group. 
24 The statement of the non-establishment of the DAGs for EUSFTA is based on the answers received by Europe Direct by 
email.  
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In the absence of DAG-to-DAG meetings, the CSF is what brings together the DAGs from 
each Party, and in most cases also other members of civil society not belonging to the DAGs. 
Among the FTAs investigated, EUSFTA is the only agreement not envisaging the creation of 
a joint dialogue of civil society.35 CETA, TTIP and EUJEPA all stipulate that the CSF comprises 
both the DAGs of each Party and other representatives of civil society, following a criterion of 
“balanced representation.”36 The purpose of the CSF appears to be limited to providing a 
platform for deliberative discussion. They may nonetheless submit views and opinions to the 
Joint and Specialised Committees. Unlike the Joint and Specialised committees, the DAGs 
and the CSF are not decisional bodies and their role remains advisory and consultative. While 
they may not be understood as institutions in legal terms, this paper adopts an historical 
institutionalist perspective which has quite an encompassing interpretation of institutions. The 
next section turns to the theoretical insights that inform this approach and how the institutional 
architecture of EU FTAs matters for fundamental rights.   
  
                                               
25 18 members for the EU DAG for CETA and 12 members for the EU DAG for EUJEPA. See respective rules of procedure, 
RoP 2.1 EU DAG for CETA and RoP 2.1 EU DAG for EUJEPA, available at 
<https://www.eesc.europa.eu/sites/default/files/files/final_rules_of_procedure_-_eu_dag_for_japan.pdf> and 
<https://www.eesc.europa.eu/sites/default/files/files/en_rules_of_procedure_for_eu_dag_for_ceta_0.pdf>.  
26 Art.23.8(4) and 24.13(5) CETA; Art.X.7 TTIP; Art.12.15 EUSFTA. The Rules of Procedure of the EU DAG for EUJEPA 
prescribes this balanced representation.  
27 When referring to “civil society actors” of the DAGs and CFS, the paper implies these categories. When referring to civil 
society actors for fundamental rights, it is implied that the focus is on those civil society actors that can be expected to advocate 
for fundamental rights, including for instance trade unions. The accountability of civil society actors goes beyond the scope of 
this paper. 
28 The EU DAGs for CETA and EUJEPA were created following a call of interest to become a DAG member. The calls specify 
that, in order to become a DAG member, a candidate would have to: be non-for profit; be registered in the EU transparency 
register and in the civil society database of the Directorate General for Trade; be effectively established in the EU; and have 
specific expertise or competence on areas covered by the sustainable development chapters. The EU DAG thereof established 
now encompasses members of the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) and members of both business and civil 
society. Call for expression of interest for the CETA EU DAGs is available here < 
https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2018/february/tradoc_156606.pdf > and the one for the EUJEPA EU DAGs here 
<https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2019/september/tradoc_158364.pdf>. 
29 RoP 11.1 EU DAG on CETA; RoP 11.1 EU DAG on EUJEPA. This is not the case for the EP, which shall be updated on the 
DAG work programme. See RoP 11.3 EU DAG on CETA; RoP 11.3 EU DAG on EUJEPA. 
30 See Government of Canada, ‘Canadians appointed to environment international advisory committees’, available at 
<https://www.canada.ca/en/environment-climate-change/corporate/international-affairs/canadian-appointed-advisory-
commitees.html> 
31 Namely Jocelyne Dubois (Director, International Department, Canadian Labour Congress, the largest trade union in Canada), 
and Derrick Hynes (President and CEO of FETCO, Federally Regulated Employers – Transportation and Communications), 
see recording of the CETA 1st Civil Society Forum Meeting (12.09.2018), available at <https://webcast.ec.europa.eu/ceta-1st-
civil-society-forum-meeting>. 
32 Among which Kelly Pike (Assistant Professor at the University of York, Canada), see Video recording of the Forum provided 
by email and made available for one week by Andreas Tibbles, Trade Policy Officer, Trade Agreements Secretariat (TCT) 
Global Affairs Canada. 
33 See presentation by Eve Päärenson (EESC EU-Japan Follow-Up Committee), ‘EU-Japan EPA and the role foreseen for civil 
society’, available at <http://www.office.kobe-u.ac.jp/ipiep/materials/EuropeanCenterSymposium2019/1-1-
4_Ms.EvePaarendson.pdf> 
34 See website of the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare (google translated) 
<https://www.mhlw.go.jp/stf/seisakunitsuite/bunya/koyou_roudou/roudouzenpan/roudouseisaku/index.html>.  
35 As for the other FTAs, provisions on a CSF are to be found in the TSD chapters (see Art.22.5 CETA; Art.X.8 TTIP; Art.16.16 
EUJEPA), with the exception of TTIP which establishes it under the institutional chapter (Art.X.8 TTIP Institutional Proposal).   
36 Art.22.5(2) CETA; Art.X.8(2) TTIP; Art.16.16(2) EUJEPA. This is also repeated in the Rules of Procedures of the EU DAGs 
for CETA and EUJEPA. 
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3. The Relevance of Institutions to Fundamental Rights: A Theoretical Framework 
This paper is interested in understanding the contribution that treaty bodies could make to 
fundamental rights. In this sense, the focus is not on what shapes institutions, but rather on 
what institutions can shape in their turn, once they are created.37 Given the nature of the 
inquiry, this paper relies on theoretical insights of historical institutionalism, according to which 
institutions matter for they affect outcomes. Historical institutionalism provides a fitting 
theoretical framework because of its attribution of varying policy outcomes to different 
institutional arrangements.38 Above all, an historical institutional perspective extends the range 
of institutions that are important to explaining outcomes.39 Its application to the present 
analysis allows to study treaty bodies of EU FTAs that other theories may either overlook or 
discard as non-institutions.  
Treaty bodies defy classic taxonomies and definitions of institutions provided by IR scholars 
or social sciences:40 they are not international institutions proper,41 nor are they informal rules 
and organised practices impacting behaviour, as assumed by sociology42 and political 
organisation theories.43 In a spectrum ranging from formal international institutions to informal 
rules, the treaty bodies of EU FTAs sit somewhere in the middle: they are formal bodies of 
rules which set up the stage for cooperation and exchanges, forming expectations with an 
impact on human behaviour and political action. By holding that formal institutions are not the 
only ones to matter, historical institutionalism allows a wider interpretation of what constitutes 
an institution and justifies the study of less formalised arenas.44 In this sense, it comes at hand 
for an analysis of treaty bodies that may not be understood as institutions proper. The treaty 
bodies of the new generation EU FTAs are considered here as institutions and to matter for 
fundamental rights. 
In order to understand how institutions matter for fundamental rights, the analysis centres on 
the institutional design of EU treaty bodies. For the purpose of this paper, institutional design 
is defined as comprising the rules that stipulate how the treaty bodies of EU FTAs are to 
                                               
37 The “why” question is what rational choice institutionalists are interested in. Rational choice institutionalism focuses on the 
forces that shape institutions, understood as the outcome of agents’ strategies; institutions are the result of deliberate choices 
to defend specific interests. See Henry Farrell, ‘The Shared Challenges of Institutional Theories: Rational Choice, Historical 
Institutionalism, and Sociological Institutionalism’ in Johannes Glückler and others (eds), Knowledge and Institutions (Springer 
2018) 24. 
38 Bulmer (n 3) 372, Farrell (n 37).  
39 Henry Farrell and Abraham Newman, ‘Making global markets: Historical institutionalism in international political economy’ 
(2010) 17 Review of International Political Economy 609, 629. 
40 See Hans Keman, ‘Approaches to the Analysis of Institutions’, in Bernard Steunenberg and Frans van Vught (eds), Political 
Institutions and Public Policy (Springer 1997). 
41 Robert O Keohane and others, After the Cold War, International Institutions and State Strategies in Europe, 1989-1991 
(Harvard University Press 1993); Robert O Keohane, ‘International Institutions: Can Interdependence Work?’ (1998) 110 
Foreign Policy 82. 
42 Sabine Saurugger and Frédéric Mérand, ‘Does European Integration Theory Need Sociology?’ (2010) 8 Comparative 
European Politics 1; Keman (n 40) 3. 
43 Johan P Olsen, Governing through Institution Building: Institutional Theory and Recent European Experiments in Democratic 
Organization (OUP 2010) 36. 
44 Bulmer (n 3) 369. 
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operate in practice.45 Institutional and IR theories tell us that institutional design matters.46 
While functionalist and power-based scholars emphasise why an institution features a certain 
institutional design,47 historical institutionalism employs a micro-level focus: it suggests to 
leverage the explanatory power of intermediating factors that may lead to a certain policy 
outcome.48 As it is too early to observe this empirically in the context of EU FTAs, rules of 
institutional design are informative of the chances for fundamental rights to be taken into 
consideration and protected at the implementation stage. They provide the basis to 
understand how far the treaty bodies of EU FTAs may (or may not) deal with fundamental 
rights when exercising their mandate. As a result, the institutional design is not regarded as a 
dependent variable, nor is it taken for granted.49 Instead, it is called into question and 
examined in its potential implications for fundamental rights.50  
In order to examine how treaty bodies of EU FTAs, and more specifically their institutional 
design, can matter for fundamental rights, the analysis relies on some of the elements that, 
according to historical institutionalism, influence and help understand policy outcomes. For 
historical institutionalism, policy outcomes are influenced by how institutional designs shape 
the preferences of the members of an institution and their behaviour and practices, including 
how they interact with each other.51 Underlying the relevance of these elements is the tenet 
whereby institutional designs create path-dependencies which will influence the course of 
policy and practices.52 Historical institutionalism predicts that most of the time, institutions will 
not perform efficiently, for they are bound by rules established in earlier times, and from which 
it is difficult to depart. The resulting policy outcomes may downgrade their usefulness or 
sideline new demands in their respect.53 For fundamental rights this could mean, inter alia, 
that mechanisms for their monitoring and protection would be constrained by existing 
                                               
45 Among issues of institutional design are i.a. whether the rules are informal or legalised, whether the commitments are 
permanent or time-bound, and whether decision-making is participatory or centralised. See Randall W Stone, ‘Institutions, 
Power, and Interdependence’, in Milner and Moravcsik (n 7) 41; Helen Milner, ‘Power, Interdependence and Nonstate Actors in 
World Politics: Research Frontiers’, in Milner and Moravcsik (n 44) 20; Bartl (n 4). 
46 Barbara Koremenos and others, The Rational Design of International Institutions (CUP 2009) 762; Ronald B Mitchell, ‘The 
Influence of International Institutions: Institutional Design, Compliance, Effectiveness and Endogeneity’, in Milner and 
Moravcsik (n 5) 66; Randall Stone, ‘Institutions, Power, and Interdependence’, in Milner (n 45) 43.  
47 As pointed out by Charles Roger, The Origins of Informality: Why the Legal Foundations of Global Governance are Shifting, 
and Why It Matters (OUP 2020) 56. 
48 Bulmer (n 3) 376. 
49 Stone (n 45) 43; Olsen (n 43); Mitchell (n 46) 81. 
50 What this paper is not concerned with is the effectiveness of institutions, if understood in the sense that treaty bodies should 
achieve the purpose for which they were created (see e.g. Timothy J McKeown, ‘The Big Influence of Big Allies: 
Transgovernmental Relations as a Tool of Statecraft’ in Milner and Moravcsik (n 7); Stephen Woolcock, ‘EU Policy on 
Preferential Trade Agreements in the 2000s: A Reorientation towards Commercial Aims’ (2014) 20 European Law Journal 718, 
726). One angle would be to consider potential for compliance with the TSD chapter, which is yet not the aim of this paper. This 
paper is also not concerned with the incentives for such compliance, nor for creating treaty bodies (see e.g. Koremenos and 
others (n 46)), since the latter are taken as the independent variables for the implications on fundamental rights.  
51 Kathleen Thelen, ‘Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics’ (1999) 2 Annual Review of Political Science 369.  
52 Bulmer (n 3) 372. 
53 Ibid. 
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practices, or even by omissions (and the scope for fundamental rights in EU FTAs is very 
limited).54  
With this in mind, the first element discussed here concerns preferences. Historical 
institutionalism maintains that institutions shape how their members will set their preferences 
over time.55 Preferences will be part of a limited menu of options provided by the creators of 
the institutions.56 For the present analysis, what is relevant is the extent to which the 
preferences of treaty bodies of EU FTAs encompass objectives of fundamental rights. The 
objectives that these treaty bodies have been set up to achieve will determine how the 
members will understand their role and what they will decide or discuss upon.57 In this regard, 
the scope of the mandate is taken as an element to be examined. Importantly, it has an impact 
on agenda-setting and outcome.58 The breadth and degree of clarity of the scope will 
determine how much discretion the members of a body will have as to the agenda items to be 
discussed. The mandate can matter for fundamental rights to the extent that it may expect 
institutions to monitor the impact of the trade agreement, or of a certain decision or policy, on 
fundamental rights, as well as to provide concrete proposals on fundamental rights. In addition, 
institutional designs that included commitments for institutions to respect fundamental rights 
and to endorse procedural good governance principles could arguably lead to more socially 
legitimate outcomes.59 
The second element considered here concerns internal processes. Historical institutionalism 
holds that institutional arrangements structure internal processes of decision-making and 
other organisational features, which in turn influence and help explain the policy outcome.60 In 
these processes, institutional design will reflect and reproduce particular patterns of power 
distribution, in what is termed the ‘distributional effect’ of institutions.61 As Wendt has pointed 
out, choices about institutional design are choices about who is empowered, or not, to make 
decisions.62 In this context, historical institutionalism holds that interactions within and between 
institutions matter.63 Hence it is important to examine the way decision-making processes are 
designed and what kind of interactions they envisage.64 For fundamental rights, the relevance 
lies in the extent to which internal processes provide for participation and institutional space 
                                               
54 See Isabella Mancini, ‘Fundamental Rights in the EU’s External Trade Relations: From Promotion ‘Through’ Trade 
Agreements to Protection ‘in’ Trade Agreements’ in Eva Kassoti and Ramses A Wessel (eds), EU Trade Agreements and the 
Duty to Respect Human Rights Abroad (CLEER PAPERS 2020/1). 
55 Mark Dawson, ‘Fundamental Rights in European Union Policy-making: The Effects and Advantages of Institutional Diversity’ 
(2020) 20 Human Rights Law Review 50, 54.  
56 Ibid. 
57 Bartl (n 4). 
58 Koremenos and others (n 46) 770. 
59 Olsen (n 43). 
60 Bulmer (n 3) 374. 
61 Thelen (n 51) 394 quoting Ikenberry 1994; Pierson 1997.  
62 Alexander Wendt, ‘Driving with the Rearview Mirror: On the Rational Science of Institutional Design’ in Koremenos and 
others, 275. See also Thelen (n 51). 
63 Dawson (n 55). 
64 Ibid. 
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to non-state actors and parliaments: not only to voice concerns related to fundamental rights, 
but also to interact with decisional bodies, if not to take part in the decision-making process 
themselves. This would also contribute to the politicisation of institutions, which can enhance 
the quality of decision-making65 and make it difficult to overlook rights-based concerns.66 As 
part of the examination of interactions, elements to consider include monitoring and 
accountability mechanisms: these are necessary so that preferences over fundamental rights 
do not remain abstract but are duly followed up and given reasons for not to.67  
The next section turns to explore these elements in the context of the new generation EU 
FTAs. It highlights omissions with respect to fundamental rights, above all in the preferences 
that the institutional design provides for the treaty bodies; as well as limitations in internal 
processes which cannot account for an institutional environment that can adequately 
safeguard fundamental rights. The layering and copy-pasting of treaty bodies across different 
FTAs, with slight differences as to civil society participation, concur with path-dependency 
predictions and outcomes that may easily ignore fundamental rights consideration and 
impacts. 
 
4. The Inadequacy of the Institutional Architecture of EU FTAs for Fundamental Rights 
4.1. Fundamental Rights Gaps in the Mandate of Treaty Bodies  
A comparison of the mandates of treaty bodies reveals that only labour rights would benefit 
from an institutional structure, which envisages monitoring compliance with them. As far as 
Joint Committees are concerned, their main function is to supervise and facilitate the 
implementation and operation of the agreement.68 The scope of the activities of a Joint 
Committee can be said to encompass all the chapters of an FTA.69 Even though the latter 
include the newly-introduced chapter on Trade and Sustainable Development (TSD), it is 
easier to imagine that the Specialised Committee on TSD will be the main body dealing with 
it. Beyond the substantive chapters to be monitored, the operation of the Joint Committees is 
not subject to principles or objectives of fundamental rights; nor do the institutional chapters 
feature overarching objectives encompassing fundamental rights. By contrast, for instance, 
Chapter 4 has shown that the chapters on regulatory cooperation in both TTIP and EUJEPA 
refer to the promotion of a transparent regulatory environment  and good regulatory practices 
                                               
65 Michael Zurn and others, ‘The politicization of world politics and its effects: Eight propositions’ (2014) 6 European Political 
Science Review 47. 
66 Dawson (n 55) 51. 
67 Gráinne De Búrca, Developing Democracy Beyond the State’ (2008) 46 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 101. 
68 Only EUJEPA specifies the aim of ensuring that the Agreement “operates properly and effectively” as a basis for the 
allocation of powers to the Joint Committee, see Art.22.1(4) and 22.1(5) EUJEPA. Compare with Art.16.1(3)(a) EUSFTA “The 
Trade Committee shall ensure that this Agreement operates properly”. 
69 See e.g. Art.26.3 CETA. In TTIP, the Joint Committee would have also had specific duties in relation to regulatory 
cooperation. 
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as some of the objectives that regulatory cooperation mechanisms should pursue and 
incorporate, and which could arguably contribute to an outcome that does not jeopardise 
fundamental rights.70 Given the institutional provisions of the FTAs, however, the objectives of 
the Joint Committees appear to remain substantive and relating to the achievement of an 
effective operation of the entire FTA. 
As to the Specialised Committees, they are similarly expected to work towards the effective 
implementation of the chapters under their responsibility. Significantly, for the first time, the 
new generation EU FTAs comprise Specialised Committees on TSD: these are executive 
bodies whose main role is to oversee the implementation of the TSD chapter, which also 
implies ensuring compliance with the commitments undertaken. Only CETA and EUJEPA 
have a fully-fledged Committee on TSD.71 The EU proposal for the institutional chapter of TTIP 
refers to the establishment of a TSD Committee, which is yet not elaborated in the EU textual 
proposal for the TSD chapter.72 As far EUSFTA is concerned, the Parties are required to 
establish a Board on TSD, but besides the task of overseeing the implementation of the 
chapter, no further powers are specified;73 above all, there are no records of its establishment. 
By contrast, both CETA and EUJEPA provide that the TSD Committee will monitor the 
implementation of the TSD chapter and add to this in different ways.  
CETA contains extensive provisions on the interaction between the TSD Committee and civil 
society, to which the chapter will turn later. While CETA provides that its Specialised 
committees - which includes the TSD Committee - can propose draft decisions to the Joint 
Committee, the specific articles on the TSD Committee do not repeat this.74 EUJEPA, by 
contrast, assigns a wider range of powers to the TSD Committee, which include: the possibility 
to make recommendations to the Joint Committee;75 to pursue cooperation between its work 
and the activities of the ILO;76 and to seek solutions to resolve differences between the Parties 
regarding the interpretation or application of the chapter.77 Notwithstanding the slight 
variations, the fact remains that the TSD Committees remain limited in what they are 
                                               
70 Art.18.1(1) EUJEPA and Art.x.1(1)(c) TTIP- EU proposal for Chapter: Regulatory Cooperation (21 March 2016). 
71 For CETA it includes the TSD chapter and also the chapters on Trade and Labour and Trade and Environment. See Art.22.4 
CETA. See, respectively, Articles 23.8(2) CETA for Trade and Labour and 24.13(3) CETA for Trade and Environment. 
72 See EU textual proposal for the TSD Chapter at <https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/november/tradoc_153923.pdf>. 
An EU position paper gives some guidance as to how this TSD Committee would have functioned: without calling it as such, 
the paper refers to a “government-to-government joint body” for the oversight and monitoring of TSD chapter implementation; 
this body would have also promoted “activities to further implement its shared objectives”, including via “decisions and 
recommendations”. EU Position Paper on Trade and sustainable Development Chapter/Labour and Environment: EU Paper 
outlining key issues and elements for provisions in the TTIP, available at 
<https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/january/tradoc_153024.pdf>. 
73 Art.12.15(3) EUSFTA. The only requirement prescribes that the meetings of the Board shall include a session with 
stakeholders, making sure to have a balanced representation of relevant interests. See Art.12.15(4) EUSFTA and Art.12.15(4) 
EUSFTA. 
74 Nonetheless, and unlike EUJEPA, CETA provides that the TSD Committee reviews the impact of the agreement on 
sustainable development (see Art.22.4(1) CETA). This is presented as an activity falling under its function to monitor the 
implementation of the agreement and it could be expected that the TSD Committee under EUJEPA would have the same task.  
75 Art.16.13(2)(a) EUJEPA. 
76 Art.16.13(4) EUJEPA. 
77 Art.16.13(2)(e) EUJEPA. 
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essentially expected to do: monitor the effective implementation of the TSD Chapter. Since 
this is where the labour rights provisions can be found, and given the TSD Committees have 
to ensure that these commitments are abided by, their mandate can be said to encompass 
fundamental rights. Labour rights yet are only a fraction of a broader range of fundamental 
rights. EU FTAs do not contain chapters for data privacy rights, and no Specialised committee 
exists to monitor the implementation of the relevant provisions. Fundamental rights that do not 
enjoy a place within the FTA do not enjoy a treaty body, chiefly because there would be no 
provision to monitor.  
Importantly, however, CETA suggests that the TSD Committee may review the impact of the 
Agreement on sustainable development.78 EUJEPA includes a self-standing provision to a 
similar effect, albeit not addressed to the TSD Committee specifically, but to the Parties and 
the institutions set up by the Agreement.79 In both cases, such an assessment could include 
potential impacts on labour rights. Importantly, whereas the task of monitoring the TSD chapter 
would imply to ensure compliance with labour rights commitments, here the reference is made 
to the impact that the whole agreement may have on sustainable development. Different 
chapters in the FTAs might indeed have an impact on labour and other fundamental rights.80 
Assessing the impact of an FTA on sustainable development, however, does not imply 
assessing the impact of an FTA on a wide range of fundamental rights that might be affected. 
While some argue that judicial review in these cases might lag behind in providing an effective 
tool,81 the Ombudsman recently made clear that the human rights impacts of an agreement 
also apply during its implementation, “in light of the human rights obligations set out in the 
Charter and in international human rights law”.82 What is now a quick reference in the text of 
CETA to engage in such review should become the object of an express duty of the TSD 
Committees. Arguably, the TSD Committees could benefit from suggestions by civil society 
actors, which may have familiarity with local fundamental problems, and which in the 
institutional architecture of EU FTAs are assigned a body and a role. 
While the preferences of the DAGs and of the CSF may depart from those of the Parties’, their 
role is mainly consultative and circumscribed to the oversight of the TSD chapter. The DAGs 
are expected to facilitate, monitor and provide views and advice on the implementation of the 
                                               
78 Art.22.4(1) CETA. 
79 Art.16.11 EUJEPA, “the Parties recognise the importance of reviewing, monitoring and assessing, jointly or individually, the 
impact of the implementation of this Agreement on sustainable development through their respective processes and 
institutions, as well as those set up under this Agreement.” 
80 Tonia Novitz, ‘Labour Standards and Trade: Need We Choose Between ‘Human Rights’ and ‘Sustainable Development’?’ in 
Henner Gott (ed), Labour standards in International Economic Law (Springer 2018); Isabella Mancini, ‘Deepening Trade and 
Fundamental Rights? Harnessing Data Protection Rights in the Regulatory Cooperation Chapters of EU Trade Agreements’, in 
Wolfgang Weiss and Cornelia Furculita (eds), Global Politics and EU Trade Policy Facing the Challenges to a Multilateral 
Approach (Springer 2020). 
81 Marise Cremona and Joanne Scott, Introduction, in Cremona and Scott, EU Law Beyond Borders: The Extraterritorial Reach 
of EU Law (OUP 2019) 19. 
82 Decision of the European Ombudsman in the joint inquiry into complaints 506-509-674-784-927-1381/2016/MHZ against the 
European Commission concerning a human rights impact assessment in the context of the EU-Turkey Agreement. 
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TSD Chapter.83 The role of the CSFs is to “conduct a dialogue”. The subject matter for this 
dialogue encompasses: the TSD chapter in EUJEPA; “sustainable development aspects of 
this Agreement” in CETA; and “the implementation and application of this Agreement” in 
TTIP.84 The texts of the FTAs suggest that the new bodies institutionalising civil society 
participation are not expected to monitor the impact of the FTAs on fundamental rights; nor to 
deliberate on them. The DAGs and the CSF are treaty bodies that are detailed in the TSD 
chapter, and which are required to facilitate and monitor its implementation. Yet, as discussed, 
fundamental rights typically remain limited to labour standards. Accordingly, the DAGs and 
the CSF will not monitor, for instance, data privacy rights in the context of e-commerce. 
Historical institutionalism suggests that the narrow scope of their mandate will have 
consequences on the agenda of their meetings, not least on what these bodies understand to 
be their role.  
The EU’s TTIP proposal is the only one, among the other FTAs, that would have extended the 
scope of the mandate of the DAGs and of the CSF to respectively oversight and conduct a 
dialogue on the implementation of the entire agreement.85 Similarly, EU civil society actors 
have recently demanded to enlarge the scope of the mandate to the whole agreement.86 Yet 
the widening of the scope does not necessarily correspond to a mandate that would come to 
aid to fundamental rights. This would be the case where civil society were asked to appreciate 
and monitor the impact of the FTA on fundamental rights, including impacts deriving from 
different chapters of the FTA. The demands to broaden the scope of the mandate were not 
motivated by this interpretation, nor have they this effect. On the motivation, demands for 
expanding the mandate find their origin in the will, by the business component of the EU DAGs, 
to be granted a role in the implementation of FTA chapters other than the one on TSD. In this 
regard, some civil society actors condemn the lack of a clear scope of action of the DAGs, as 
everything could be on their agenda.87 A wider agenda might indeed take away room for 
discussion on matters related to e.g. trade and labour, since other economic matters pertaining 
to the FTA could be prioritised. 
Regarding the implications, facilitating and monitoring the implementation of the agreement 
does not mean monitoring its impact on something else (as could be fundamental rights); or 
facilitating the realisation of something falling outside its scope. As discussed, this is 
                                               
83 The proposal of TTIP differs from the other FTAs in that it would have extended scope of their oversight to the entire 
agreement. Art.X.7(1) EU TTIP proposal for Institutional, General and Final Provisions. See discussion later. 
84 Art.23.8(4) CETA; Art.X.7(1) TTIP; Art.12.15(5) EUSFTA; Art.16.15(1) EUJEPA. 
85 Art.X.7(1) EU TTIP proposal for Institutional, General and Final Provisions. 
86 See Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee, ‘The role of Domestic Advisory Groups in monitoring the 
implementation of Free Trade Agreements’ (adopted 15 January 2019), available at <https://www.eesc.europa.eu/en/our-
work/opinions-information-reports/opinions/role-domestic-advisory-groups-monitoring-implementation-free-trade-agreements>; 
Non-paper of the Commission services, ‘Feedback and way forward on improving the implementation and enforcement of 
Trade and Sustainable Development chapters in EU Free Trade Agreements’ (26 February 2018), available at 
<https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2018/february/tradoc_156618.pdf> (hereafter: European Commission, ‘Non-paper’). 
87 Informal interview with civil society representatives.  
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problematic in the quasi-absence of fundamental rights in FTAs, as there would be very little 
to monitor in their respect. The European Commission understands civil society mechanisms 
as means for continuous analysis of the “effectiveness” of the TSD chapters.88 While crucial, 
such an understanding omits and prevents examinations of intrinsic linkages between other 
sections of the FTAs and fundamental rights. It also excludes ex-post evaluations of the 
negative impacts predicted in the ex-ante sustainability impact assessments. The 
methodology of the ex-post impact assessments of EU FTAs corroborates this observation.89 
While stakeholders may be consulted, the DAGs and the CSF have no formal role in ex-post 
monitoring processes. In any case, they are not required, as per their role, to check that 
implementation of an FTA respects fundamental rights. Their duty is to ensure that the 
commitments of the Parties under the agreement are fulfilled.  
As the DAGs and the CSF are not required to monitor the impact on fundamental rights, 
deliberation on these issues also risks remaining on the margins. If treaty bodies can be 
understood as endeavours of institutionalisation in the sense of formalising and stabilising 
practices and cooperation, then the DAGs and the CSF represent unique institutionalised 
channels for regular meetings. Periodic interaction and horizontal exchanges between EU and 
partner countries’ civil society are likely to benefit information-sharing and can be conducive 
to policy learning and innovation.90 The experience with CETA so far shows that the CSF can 
work as a platform for dialogue on cooperation on labour standards with third FTA partners; 
and also as a springboard for joint initiatives, such as joint workshops with civil society on 
collective bargaining.91 The agenda of the EU-Canada CSF was also open to “any other 
issues”, albeit limited to the field of TSD. Particularly at this stage, civil society actors should 
prompt discourses on the relationship between trade and fundamental rights, how this 
relationship should be understood and the way forward. What matters eventually, will be that 
the DAGs and the CSF manage to put these issues on the agenda.  
 
4.2. Decision-making Processes that can Sideline Fundamental Rights  
In the implementation phase of FTAs, the Joint Committees, and in some cases the 
specialised committees, are the main bodies that can take decisions, with no oversight 
                                               
88 European Commission, ‘Non-paper’ (n 86). The Commission services consider it key to continue to engage with Member 
States, the European Parliament, interested stakeholders and the public to continuously analyse the effectiveness of the 
implementation of the TSD chapters (e.g. through review clauses; annual FTA implementation reports; ex-post impact 
assessments). 
89 See Elisabeth B Bonanomi, ‘Measuring Human Rights Impacts of Trade Agreements-Ideas for Improving the Methodology: 
Comparing the European Union’s Sustainability Impact Assessment Practice and Methodology with Human Rights Impact 
Assessment Methodology’ (2017) 9 Journal of Human Rights Practice 481. 
90 Evgeny Postnikov and Ida Bastiaens, ‘Does dialogue work? The effectiveness of labor standards in EU preferential trade 
agreements’ (2014) 21 Journal of European Public Policy 923. 
91 European Commission, ‘Joint Report’ (2019) (Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement: Meeting of the Civil Society 
Forum, 12 November 2019, Ottawa), available at <https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2020/march/tradoc_158679.pdf>. 
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mechanisms being applied to them. Significantly, Joint Committees can take decisions that 
will be binding on the under international law on the Parties, as well as under EU law on the 
EU and its Member States.92 The powers of the Joint Committees appear to go beyond the 
mere executive implementation of obligations within the scope of the FTAs.93 Their decision-
making powers encompass an indefinite range of issues with potential implications on 
fundamental rights.94 As more political functions are being attached to executive treaty 
bodies,95 the internal process of decision-making requires political oversight by parliaments 
and civil society. It has been argued that insofar as authorities that operate beyond the State 
are vested with more political functions, a pressing need of legitimation necessarily arises.96 
The examination of the rules for processes of decision-making, including how actors are to 
interact with each other, reveal that issues of fundamental rights can be easily side-lined. 
 
4.2.1. The Discretional Interaction with Civil Society 
Interaction with DAGs and the CSF is not compulsory and appears to remain a remote 
possibility. Civil society actors do not take part in the meetings of the Joint Committees; their 
function appears to remain representative and consultative. When looking at the texts of the 
FTAs, no provisions expressly provide that the Joint Committees are required to let civil society 
actors join their meetings. In some of the institutional chapters, the Parties recall the 
importance of considering the views of the public, as a way to “draw on a broad range of 
perspectives” in the implementation stage.97 However, when it comes to the functioning of the 
Joint Committee more specifically, the institutionalisation of interactions with the public is 
nearly absent. 
                                               
92 Decisions become binding under international law by virtue of their adoption by the Joint Committee, as the EU can enter into 
international commitments following the simplified procedures of Articles 218(7) and 218(9) TFEU: in the case of CETA, the 
Council decided that the former was indeed the procedure to follow for the adoption of the decisions by the CETA Joint 
Committee. For a thorough explanation, see Wolfgang Weiss, ‘Delegation to treaty bodies in EU agreements: constitutional 
constraints and proposals for strengthening the European Parliament' (2018) 14 European Constitutional Law Review 532. 
Decisions are binding under EU law as a result of Art.216(2) TFEU, read in conjunction with case law that stipulates that treaty 
committees’ decisions constitute international agreements and form part of EU law (Case 30/88, Hellenic Republic v 
Commission of the European Communities ECLI:EU:C:1989:422; C-192/89, Sevince v Staatssecretaris van Justitie 
ECLI:EU:C:1990:322). See Mario Mendez, The Legal Effects of EU Agreements (OUP 2013); Ramses Wessel and Steven 
Blockmans, ‘The Legal Status and Influence of Decisions of International Organizations and other Bodies in the European 
Union’ in Piet Eckhout and Manuel López Escudero (eds), The European Union’s External Action in Times of Crisis (Hart 
2016). 
93 Weiss (n 1) 536. 
94 Ibid.  
95 Wolfgang Weiss, ‘Implementing CETA in the EU: Challenges for democracy and executive-legislative institutional balance 
due to the limited role of the European Parliament in the treaty bodies’ decision-making’ (paper presented at CETA Implications 
Conference CETA Implementation and Implications Project (CIIP), 27-28 September 2019, University Hall, Dalhousie 
University) (hereafter Weiss, ‘Implementing CETA’) 7. 
96 Pieter De Wilde and Michael Zürn, ‘Can the politicization of European integration be reversed?’ (2012) 50 Journal of 
Common Market Studies 137; Zürn and others, ‘International authority and its politicization’ (2012) 4 International Theory 69. 
97 Art.X.1(8) TTIP and Art.16.6 EUSFTA. TTIP also adds that this is relevant in the context of the domestic advisory groups and 
the Civil Society Forum, see Art.X.1(8) TTIP.  
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Image No.1: Interactions of the Joint Committee with non-state actors per FTA.98 
CETA and EUSFTA stipulate that the Joint Committee may communicate with all interested 
parties, including the private sector and civil society organisations.99 In EUJEPA, the Joint 
Committee may provide information to the public, which yet suggests a debriefing opportunity, 
rather than an actual communication or exchange.100 Only TTIP clearly mandates that the 
Joint Committee meet with the Civil Society Forum.101 The participants of the first meeting of 
the CETA Joint Committee were limited to the Canadian Minister for Trade, the EU 
Commissioner for Trade, delegations, the contact points and representatives from the EU MS 
and Canadian Provinces and Territories.102 The agenda of the meeting omitted any interaction 
or ex-post debrief session with civil society. The same occurred at the first meeting of the Joint 
Committee under EUJEPA.103 As to EUSFTA, no meetings appear to have taken place so 
far.104 
A slightly different picture emerges for the Specialised Committees. Regarding the TSD 
Committees, CETA is replete with provisions for exchanges with civil society. The CETA TSD 
Committee is expected to “promote transparency and public participation” and to publish any 
decision or report it produces;105 to hold a session with the public to discuss the 
implementation of the chapter;106 and to present updates on implementation to the Civil 
Society Forum, including annual reports as to its follow-ups on these communications.107 
EUJEPA provides that one of the functions of the TSD Committee is to interact with civil society 
but does not elaborate further on this.108 In EUJEPA, it is up to the Parties to give information 
on the implementation of the TSD chapter to the Joint Dialogue with civil society.109 Beyond 
                                               
98 Source: compilation of the author based on treaty provisions. 
99 Art.26.1(5)(b) CETA and Art.16.1(4)(b) EUSFTA. 
100 Art.22.1(5)(c) EUJEPA. 
101 Art.X.1(9) TTIP. 
102 See European Commission, ‘Report’ (Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA): Meeting of the Joint 
Committee, 26 September 2018, Montreal (Canada), available at 
<https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2018/october/tradoc_157470.pdf> 
103 See European Commission, ‘Agenda’ (Meeting of Japan-EU EPA Joint Committee, 10 April 2019, Tokyo), available at 
<https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2019/july/tradoc_157971.pdf>. 
104 No documents are available, see <https://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/eu-singapore-agreement/index_en.htm>. 
105 Art.22.4(4)(a) CETA. 
106 Art.22.4(3) CETA. 
107 Art.22.4(4)(b) CETA. 
108 Art.16.13(2)(c) EUJEPA. 
109 Art.16.16(4) EUJEPA. 
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the TSD Committees, an additional comparison can be made with the specialised committees 
for Regulatory Cooperation. In the relevant chapter, CETA allows civil society to provide input, 
but not to join the meetings of the Regulatory Cooperation Forum. Nonetheless, the meeting 
in December 2018 ended with a “stakeholders debrief session” which “registered 
stakeholders” could attend.110 By contrast, no such debrief session was foreseen or took place 
at the first meeting of the EUJEPA Regulatory Cooperation Committee.111  
The existence of requirements to interact with civil society yet is not the same as making those 
actors observers or true participants of the meetings. CETA lacks provisions to that effect. 
Still, at the end of its meetings, the CETA TSD Committee has so far carried “meeting reviews” 
with civil society representatives belonging to the DAGs.112 The review includes a debrief 
session, where the TSD Committee informs the DAGs of its discussions;113 views are then 
exchanged with the DAGs chairs, which allows them to provide feedback to the TSD 
Committee’s work plan, to present their Joint Statement, and to inform the TSD Committee on 
the discussions at the Civil Society Forum.114 Conversely, once again, the first meeting of the 
EUJEPA TSD Committee held no dedicated sessions with civil society.115 What emerges from 
this picture is that the disparity across trade agreements in what they provide as to external 
participation is also reflected in the role of civil society in the implementation process. Still, 
CETA is an exemplary case of effort and best practices going beyond what is provided under 
the agreement itself. The late politicisation of its negotiation has prompted huge interest by 
many civil society actors in scrutinising its implementation. Civil society actors seem to have 
welcomed the transparency practices by the CETA specialised committees.116 Considering 
that such best practices have not triggered in the context of EUJEPA, it could be questioned 
how these informal practices left to the discretion of the Parties compare with what could be a 
legally-embedded and more meaningful participation in the actual meetings. Such 
                                               
110 European Commission, ‘Agenda’ (1st Meeting of the CETA Regulatory Cooperation Forum, 14 December 2018) 4, available 
at < http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1811>. See also European Commission, ‘CETA Regulatory 
Cooperation Forum – Stakeholder Debrief Meeting’ (4 February 2020), available at 
<http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1811>. 
111 European Commission, ‘Agenda’ (EU-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA): First Meeting of the Committee on 
Regulatory Cooperation, 20 January 2020, Video Conference), available at 
<https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2020/january/tradoc_158579.pdf>. 
112 European Commission, ‘Agenda’ (Meeting of Committee on Trade and Sustainable Development, 13 September 2018 
Brussels), available at <https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2018/august/tradoc_157266.pdf>; and European Commission, 
‘Agenda’ (Meeting of Committee on Trade and Sustainable Development, 13 November 2019, Ottawa), available at 
<https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2019/november/tradoc_158424.11.19%20(for%20publication).pdf>.  
113 Ibid.  
114 European Commission, ‘Joint Report’ (Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA): Meeting of the Committee 
on Trade and Sustainable Development, 13 November 2019, Ottawa), available at 
<https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2020/january/tradoc_158604.pdf>. 
115 European Commission, ‘Agenda’ (EU-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA): First Meeting of the Committee on 
Trade and Sustainable Development, 29-30 January 2020, Tokyo), available at 
<https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2020/january/tradoc_158594.pdf>. 
116 The EU Commission has gradually come to recognise the advantages of interacting with civil society actors, as those who 
have knowledge and information on the ground, thus supporting a bottom-up approach to the implementation of EU FTAs. See 
European Commission, ‘Report’ (Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA): 1st Meeting of the CETA 
Regulatory Cooperation Forum, 14 December 2018, Brussels and by videoconference), available at 
<https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2019/february/tradoc_157679.pdf>. 
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participation would not be meaningful in the absence of follow-up mechanisms. Yet in the 
FTAs at hand this is the case. 
 
4.2.2. Absence of Follow-up Mechanisms 
Unlike the Joint and Specialised committees, the DAGs and the CSF do not have decision-
making powers. They can nonetheless “submit views and recommendations” on their own 
initiative.117 What is interesting for the present exploration is to examine how these views are 
followed up. The interactions with the Joint and Specialised committees would be futile if the 
views and recommendations of civil society actors were not followed up. Internal processes of 
decision-making could still sideline fundamental rights. In this context, accountability 
mechanisms are considered here to enhance the chances for the demands of the DAGs and 
CSF to find their way into the policy process, and the extent to which the executive bodies 
would feel obliged to take them into account.118 Formal feedback mechanisms whereby the 
Joint and Specialised Committees had to explain which inputs were used and which were not 
would be an example.119 Arguably, the shorter the reporting chain from one treaty body to 
another, the better for accountability and organisational efficiency. It will be shown that while 
FTAs might envisage a certain procedure, the actual practice has developed otherwise and 
inconsistently across trade partners. The resulting organisational confusion inevitably creates 
accountability concerns and risks creating dysfunctional path-dependencies. 
The views of the DAGs and of the CSF are subject to different rules, which are to be found 
respectively in the Rules of Procedure and in the trade agreement. As for the DAGs, the Rules 
of Procedure of the EU DAGs for CETA and EUJEPA are similar: views can be expressed in 
recommendations and/or communications adopted by consensus;120 these views then may be 
submitted to a series of bodies: from the TSD Committee, to the Parties to the Agreement, EU 
institutions, the trade-partner DAG and any other relevant body.121 The DAGs can decide who 
the target for their recommendations will be. EUSFTA is the only agreement that expressly 
stipulates that the DAGs may submit their recommendations directly to the Parties.122 It does 
not, however, establish a CSF. As for the CSF, different FTAs provide different modalities of 
interaction. The image below shows the interactions of the CSF, the TSD Committee and the 
Joint Committee as provided by the texts of the trade agreements. It highlights the extension 
                                               
117 Ibid. In EUJEPA, this is not expressly mentioned, but it can be expected that the DAGs would have similar opportunities to 
do so. To submit such recommendations, a DAG adopts declarations which have to be consented to and voted by its members.  
118 Lore Van Den Putte, ‘Involving Civil Society in Social Clauses and the Decent Work Agenda’ (2015) 6 Global Labour Journal 
221, 225-226. 
119 Ibid.  
120 See e.g. RoP 6.1 and 10.1 EU DAG for CETA; RoP 10.4 EU DAG for EUJEPA.  
121 RoP 10.1 EU DAG for CETA; RoP 10.1 EU DAG for EUJEPA. CETA also expressly mentions the Panel of Experts and the 
Civil Society Forum. Since both are bodies that are also created under EUJEPA, it may be expected that “any other relevant 
body” encompasses them as well. 
122 Art.12.15(5) EUSFTA. 
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of the reporting chain before the outcome of the CSF deliberations arrive at the main decision-
makers, i.e. the Joint Committee and/or the Parties. 
 
Image No.2: Interactions between different treaty bodies as per the text of the trade agreements. 
The visualisation reveals that the shortest route for the CSF to the Parties is provided in CETA: 
here, the views of the DAGs and other civil society actors can be presented directly to the 
Parties.123 Similarly, under TTIP, the CSF would have directly met with the Joint Committee.124 
EUJEPA creates the longest route: the CSF can submit opinions and views to the TSD 
Committee first,125 which in turn may make recommendations or propose draft decisions to 
the Joint Committee.126 These institutional designs can be compared with the EU AAs with 
Ukraine and Moldova: here, the Civil Society Platforms can submit recommendations directly 
to the Association Council, which is the corresponding body of the Joint Committee in FTAs.127 
However, looking at the operation of these treaty bodies on the ground, it emerges that the 
FTAs provide only a starting point for how different bodies may interact, leaving a wide margin 
of discretion as to who can report what, to whom and when.  
In the context of CETA, representatives of the DAGs have so far taken part in the CSF and 
then reported to the TSD Committee the following day, during the last sessions of the TSD 
                                               
123 Art.22.4(4)(b) CETA. 
124 Which is co-chaired by a representative of DG Trade and the trade partner’s Trade Minister. See Art.X.1(9) TTIP Institutional 
chapter. 
125 Art.16.16(4) EUJEPA. 
126 Articles 16.13(2)(a) and 22.3(5) EUJEPA. 
127 Art.443 EU-Moldova Association Agreement, between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community 
and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Moldova, of the other part, OJ L 260, 30.8.2014, 4.  
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committee meetings: they have informed the TSD committee of the CSF discussions, 
presented their joint statement, and given feedback. While this would suggest that the TSD 
Committee and the CSF as a whole have not interacted directly, in fact the TSD Committee 
has presided over the CSF, which means a chance for it to become acquainted with the views 
raised by civil society. The CSF in any case seems to work as a background platform where 
different issues are discussed, before these are presented to the TSD Committee by the DAGs 
Co-Chairs. Following the Rules of Procedure, the CETA Joint Committee will be informed by 
the Specialised committees on the conclusions of the meetings of the TSD Committees.128 It 
can be hoped that the TSD Committee will also report on its discussions with the DAGs, and 
will thus inform the Joint Committee about civil society’s opinions.  
In the context of EUJEPA, the Joint Dialogue with Civil Society has followed a different path. 
The agenda of its first meeting envisaged that “participants of civil society” exchanged views 
directly with “representatives of the EU Commission and the Government of Japan.”129 While 
it can be expected that civil society comprised the DAGs of each side,130 it is not clear whether 
the representatives of the Parties were members of the TSD Committee, as provided by the 
text of EUJEPA. Beyond the Joint Dialogue with Civil Society, the first meeting of the EU-
Japan TSD Committee did not include any exchange of views with the DAGs Co-chairs - unlike 
the practice developed for CETA.131 However, both sides reassured that the views expressed 
by the DAGs on the implementation of the TSD chapter “would be duly received.”132 The TSD 
Committee also decided on a number of issues related to the Joint Dialogue with Civil Society: 
among others, that the Dialogue would be organised by the TSD Committee and be held back-
to-back with the TSD Committee; and that its minutes would be made publicly available.133 As 
the minutes have not been published,134 it is not possible to assess whether the views voiced 
at the Joint Dialogue have influenced the decisional bodies. Furthermore, unlike CETA, the 
specialised committees are not required to report to the Joint Committee on the conclusions 
of their meetings.135 No follow-up requirements are demanded to the Joint Committee, nor to 
the TSD Committee.  
                                               
128 RoP 14 Council decision (EU) 2018/1062 of 16 July 2018 on the position to be adopted on behalf of the European Union 
within the CETA Joint Committee established by the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement between Canada, of the 
one part, and the European Union and its Member States, of the other part as regards the adoption of the Rules of Procedure 
of the CETA Joint Committee and specialised committees, OJ L 190/13 (27.7.2018). 
129 European Commission, ‘Agenda’ (Trade And Sustainable Development Joint Dialogue with Civil Society, 31 january 2019), 
available at <https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2020/january/tradoc_158578.pdf>. 
130 See presentation by Eve Päärendson, EESC EU-Japan Follow-Up Committee, at <http://www.office.kobe-
u.ac.jp/ipiep/materials/EuropeanCenterSymposium2019/1-1-4_Ms.EvePaarendson.pdf>. 
131 See Joint Minutes of the 1st Meeting of the Committee on Trade and Sustainable Development under the Agreement 
between the European Union and Japan for an Economic Partnership (Tokyo, 29-30 January 2020), available at 
<https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2020/march/tradoc_158664.pdf>. 
132 Ibid.  
133 Ibid.  
134 See list of ‘EU-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) - Meetings and documents’ currently available at 
<https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=2042>.  
135 See RoP of the EU-Japan Joint Committee, Decision No 1/2019 of 10 April 2019 of the Joint Committee of the EU-Japan 
EPA [2019/1035] OJ L167/81 (24.6.2019); compare with RoP 14(3) of the EU-Canada Joint Committee (n 162). 
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CETA is the only FTA which expressly requires the TSD Committee to report back to the CSF 
on the follow-up to the views of civil society presented to the Parties.136 This unique provision 
can be expected to enhance accountability and reason-giving processes. It must still be seen, 
however, how it will be used. So far, the Rules of Procedures of the Joint and Specialised 
committees are silent on the matter. Furthermore, as the recordings of the Forum discussions 
have not been made publicly available, but only its summaries,137 it is not easy to assess the 
Joint Committee’s measures vis-a-vis civil society’s demands. Importantly, the TSD 
Committee itself could also propose draft decisions to the Joint Committee. This seems to 
have been the case for the three recommendations (on SMEs, climate and gender) that the 
Joint Committee adopted at its first meeting, and which the TSD Committee reports to have 
prepared in the framework of the work on TSD implementation.138 Absent the report of the first 
EU-Canada CSF meeting, it is not possible to draw a causal relation between the Forum 
discussions and the above-mentioned recommendations. Some members of civil society in 
fact denounce the aleatory targeting of certain issues, which conceal and prevent progress on 
other more pressing (“the real”) issues.139 Eventually, the CETA TSD Committee remains free 
to set its own agenda and decide which recommendations it may make to the Joint 
Committee.140 
Against this backdrop, it is argued here that the DAGs and the CSF are not the only organs 
that can influence the internal processes of decision-making. The European Parliament should 
be able to exercise political control and influence the agenda in a way that reflects citizens’ 
concerns. Its involvement could ensure that the democratic quality of EU external trade does 
not stop at the negotiation and conclusion of FTAs, but continues throughout their 
implementation. As the next section shows, however, the EP does not enjoy a formal place 
within the institutional architecture, nor within the process of decision-making.  
                                               
136 Art.22.4(4)(b) CETA. 
137 With the exception of the recording of the first meeting of the EU-Canada CSF on 12 September 2018 (see EU-Canada Civil 
Society Forum: Trade and Sustainable Development under CETA at 
<http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/events/index.cfm?id=1901>) and the joint statements by the DAGs, see “Joint Statement of 
the Canadian and European Domestic Advisory Groups” mentioned at the Meeting of the Committee on Trade and Sustainable 
development (Ottawa, 13 November 2019), available at 
<https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2020/january/tradoc_158604.pdf>.  
138 See European Commission, ‘Joint Report’ (Meeting of the Committee on Trade and Sustainable Development, Brussels, 13 
September 2018), available at <https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2018/september/tradoc_157409.pdf>.  
139 Informal interview with representative of civil society. 
140 RoP 8 of the CETA Joint Committee, to be read in conjunction with RoP 14(4). 
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4.2.3. The Relegation of the European Parliament 
The European Parliament is absent from the bodies of the institutional architecture of EU 
FTAs. The EP is an already-existing institution and would not be the output of some provisions 
within the FTAs. Still, one would expect that, especially in light of its empowerment during the 
negotiation process, it was granted a place in the implementation stage as well. This 
expectation becomes stronger when considering the EU Association Agreements, which 
provide an insightful, existing alternative institutional design.141 For example, the EU-Ukraine 
AA foresees a Parliamentary Association Committee, composed of members of the EP and of 
the Ukrainian Parliament.142 Significantly, this body would have a series of powers: to request 
information on the AA implementation to the Association Council, the corresponding body of 
the Joint Committee in FTAs; to be informed of decisions and recommendations; to make 
recommendations itself directly to the Association Council; and to create Parliamentary 
Association sub-committees.143  
Exceptionally, the EU proposal for the institutional chapter of TTIP would have emphasised 
the importance of the Transatlantic Legislators Dialogue (TLD). This Dialogue would have not 
constituted a treaty body proper of the agreement, yet it longed to “foster the parliamentary 
dimension” of the Agreement.144 Although this is unique in the history of EU FTAs, and it may 
have well enhanced the involvement of the parliaments from both sides, there are no 
provisions providing an express role for the TLD in the work of the Joint or Specialised 
Committees. The place that the TLD would occupy in the operation of the Agreement thus 
remains unclear. By contrast, the TTIP proposal for regulatory cooperation of 2015 included a 
placeholder on the interaction of the RCB with legislative bodies.145   
                                               
141 See i.a. Art.121 EU-Bosnia and Herzegovina AA (Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European 
Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, of the other part, OJ L 164, 30.6.2015, 
p.2); Art.440 EU-Moldova AA (Association Agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy 
Community and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Moldova, of the other part, OJ L 260, 30.8.2014, p.4); 
Art.467 EU-Ukraine AA (Association Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and 
Ukraine, of the other part, OJ L 161/3, 29.5.2014). 
142 Art.467 EU-Ukraine AA. 
143 Art.468 EU-Ukraine AA. 
144 Art.X.6 TTIP. 
145 Art.14(6) TTIP proposal for regulatory Cooperation 2015. 
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Not only does the EP not enjoy a place within the institutional architecture. It is also relegated 
in decision-making processes. None of the FTAs gives parliaments a say in decision-making 
by the Joint Committee. Compared to civil society actors, the EP also enjoys a less privileged 
place in the meetings of the Joint Committee: while some FTAs provide that the Joint 
Committee may communicate with civil society, nothing is mentioned about parliaments.146 As 
decision-making remains a prerogative of intergovernmental bodies, a clear imbalance 
emerges between the strong executive presence and the lack of parliamentary involvement. 
This may come as no surprise since external relations have historically pertained to the 
executive, and the implementation of trade agreements at the international level is not a task 
for parliaments.147 However, this should not lead to the conclusion that parliaments can be 
excluded from this stage and in the decision-making processes that follow. Above all, a key 
role of parliaments is to scrutinise and control the work of the executive. Insofar as trade 
agreements deepen and politicise, the traditional domination of the executive becomes 
increasingly obsolete. Yet what we see in the implementation of EU FTAs is not a trend of 
more prominent role being granted to parliaments. 
The lack of parliamentary scrutiny of decision-making by treaty bodies is blatant on the EU 
side. In most third Parties the parliaments eventually come into play for passing implementing 
legislation.148 By contrast, the internal procedures at the EU level may easily sideline the EP. 
What follows explains how this can be so, by looking at the ex ante and ex post control 
mechanisms that the EP can exercise in the decision-making processes by treaty bodies: not 
only bilaterally (within the Joint Committee), but also domestically (at the EU level). The image 
below visualises the EP’s limitations in monitoring the executive at the bilateral and domestic 
level, both before and after a Joint Committee takes a decision. 
 
Image No.3: EP’s limitations in decision-making.149 
                                               
146 Art.26.1(5)(b) CETA and Art.16.1(4)(b) EUSFTA. 
147 Weiss, ‘Implementing CETA’ (n 95) 5. 
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In the early life-cycle of a treaty body decision, the EP lacks ex ante scrutiny powers, both at 
the bilateral and EU level. Bilaterally, the EP does not take part in the meetings of the treaty 
bodies and has no right to be informed. The Framework Agreement between the EP and the 
Commission opens up the possibility for the EP to be invited to the meetings of bodies set up 
by multilateral agreements, which yet fails to capture bilateral FTAs.150 At the meetings of the 
Joint or specialised committees, the representatives of the Parties may find agreement on a 
decision. Yet before a decision is adopted at the bilateral level, the Council has to endorse the 
position to be taken on behalf of the Union within the treaty body. This is the step at the EU 
level where the EP is not involved and cannot exercise ex ante control. Following the simplified 
procedure of Article 218(9) TFEU, when a treaty body is called upon to adopt “acts having 
legal effects”,151 the Council shall rely on a proposal of the Commission to adopt a decision; 
this decision will represent the position to be taken by the EU negotiator within that treaty 
body.152 Via another simplified procedure, set out in Article 218(7) TFEU, the Council may 
directly authorise the Commission to approve amendments to an FTA by a treaty body. 
Together, these articles have been said to constitute “special regimes” whereby EU secondary 
law is adopted within treaty bodies.153  
Neither of these “special regimes” grant a say to the EP. Dawson has shown that the ordinary 
legislative procedure carries advantages for fundamental rights protection since it allows 
articulating fundamental rights arguments “that other forms of EU governance may not”.154 By 
contrast, fundamental rights may be neglected when policies are managed outside this 
procedure, “through institutional forms that lack the checks and balances the ordinary 
legislative process entails.”155 Given the EP’s lack of say in these special regimes, in its rules 
                                               
148 Bart Kerremans and others, ‘Parliamentary scrutiny of trade policies across the western world’ (2019) (Study requested by 
INTA Committee).  
149 Source: compilation of the author based on treaty provisions. 
150 Framework Agreement on relations between the European Parliament and the European Commission (OJ L304/47, 
20.11.2010) 26. 
151 With the exception of “acts supplementing or amending the institutional framework of the agreement”, requiring ordinary 
legislative procedure. For a thorough discussion of Article 218(9) TFEU see Alan Dashwood, ‘EU Acts and Member State Acts 
in the Negotiation, Conclusion and Implementation of International Agreements’ in Marise Cremona and Claire Kilpatrick (eds),  
EU Legal Acts: Challenges and Transformations (OUP 2018); and Joni Heliskoski, ‘The Procedural Law of International 
Agreements: A Thematic Journey through Article 218 TFEU’ (2020) 57 Common Market Law Review 79.  
152 This procedural legal basis was employed recently for the decisions by the Joint Committee of CETA (see European 
Commission, ‘Proposal for a Council Decision on the position to be taken on behalf of the European Union in the CETA Joint 
Committee established under the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) between Canada, of the one part, 
and the European Union and its Member States, of the other part as regards the adoption of a decision setting out the 
administrative and organisational matters regarding the functioning of the Appellate Tribunal’ COM(2019)  457 final, 2019/0217 
(NLE), Brussels, 11.10.2019) and by a Working Group of the EU-South-Korea FTA, see  Council Decision (EU) 2019/845 of 17 
May 2019 on the position to be taken on behalf of the European Union, within the Working Group on Geographical Indications 
established by the Free Trade Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the 
Republic of Korea, of the other part, as regards the adoption of its rules of procedure (OJ L 138/84, 24.5.2019). For legal basis 
justification, see European Commission, “Proposal for a COUNCIL DECISION on the position to be taken on behalf of the 
European Union, in the Working Group on Geographical indications set up by the Free Trade Agreement between the 
European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Korea, of the other part, as regards the adoption 
of its rules of procedure” (COM/2019/181 final). 
153 Weiss, ‘Delegation to treaty bodies in EU agreements’ (n 2) 541. 
154 Dawson (n 55) 73. This is not to suggest that ordinary legislative procedure should apply in this case, but to provide an 
example of how other procedures may lack the checks and balances that would ensure that fundamental rights are not 
neglected.  
155 Ibid.  
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of procedure, the EP carved out the possibility of issuing recommendations on the proposed 
positions.156 This shows an awareness of its lack of say in this process and an attempt to 
assert its role. At the same time, however, its recommendations would remain unilateral 
actions. The Commission would be under no duty to take them into account. On the other 
hand, while the EP has no right to be informed about the discussions of the treaty bodies, one 
can expect its right to be “immediately and fully informed”, as per Article 218 TFEU, to apply 
also at this domestic stage.157 As suggested by Weiss, a more meaningful control by the EP 
would involve a consent requirement before the Council adopts the position - something which 
could be enshrined in the Council’s decision approving the FTA.158  
After a position at the EU level is endorsed, the EP is absent once again at the bilateral level 
when a decision is adopted. Joint and Specialised committees take decisions by consensus.159 
The EP has no formal role in the adoption of decisions. The power to take decisions exclusively 
rests on the executive intergovernmental bodies and defies parliamentary oversight. From an 
EU perspective, the dual source of democratic legitimacy, based on the representation by both 
the Council and the EP, is thereby compromised.160 It has been suggested that the EP should 
be made part of the representatives of the EU within the treaty bodies, or at least be granted 
an observer status and be informed throughout the process.161  
Once a decision at the bilateral level is adopted, the EP’s control mechanisms are again quite 
limited. At the EU level, the EP is not implicated when the decisions do not require ratification. 
All the trade agreements under investigation stipulate that the decisions will be binding upon 
the Parties.162 While the status of these decisions in EU law is disputed and controversial,163 
what becomes problematic for the present argument is that in this process, even in the 
absence of direct effect, these decisions are liable to have legal effects on the EU legal order 
“without any subsequent act of adoption by the Union’s institutions”.164 The EP would remain 
outside this process. It has been suggested that the EP be given the possibility to suspend 
the decision.165 At the same time, bilaterally, the EP’s control powers are limited to its own-
                                               
156 Rule 109: Provisional application or suspension of the application of international agreements or establishment of the 
Union's position in a body set up by an international agreement. 
157 Article 218(10) TFEU. 
158 If the treaty body decision amounts to rule-making which interferes with tasks of the European Parliament, see Weiss, 
‘Implementing CETA’ (n 95) 16. 
159 See i.a. Art.26.4(3) and Art.26.2(4) CETA; Art.X.4 TTIP; Art.16.4(3) EUSFTA; Art.22.2(3) and Art.22.3(3)(e) EUJEPA. 
160 Thomas Verellen, ‘On Conferral, Institutional Balance and Non-binding International Agreements: The Swiss MoU Case’ 
(2016) 1 European Papers 1225 (Insight). 
161 Weiss (n 95); Eyal Benvenisti, ‘Democracy Captured: The Mega‐Regional Agreements and the Future of Global Public Law 
(2013) 23 Constellations 58; Alberto Alemanno, ‘The Regulatory Cooperation Chapter of the Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership: Institutional Structures and Democratic Consequences’ (2015) 18 Journal of International Economic 
Law 625.  
162 Art.26.4(2) CETA; Art.X.4 TTIP; Art.16.4(1) EUSFTA; 22.2(1) EUJEPA 
163 Ramses Wessel and Steven Blockmans, ‘The Legal Status and Influence of Decisions of International Organizations and 
other Bodies in the European Union’ in Piet Eckhout and Manuel López Escudero (eds), The European Union’s External Action 
in Times of Crisis (Hart 2016). 
164 See Joni Heliskoski, casenote on Case 370/07, Commission v. Council (2011) Common Market Law Review 555, 557-558. 
165 Weiss ‘Delegation to treaty bodies in EU agreements’ (n 2) 552. 
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developed monitoring mechanisms, which would supervise the implementation of the decision 
and the FTA more broadly.166  
Overall, the EP’s role in the implementation phase has remained low profile. This is in stark 
contrast with the EP’s recently enhanced involvement in the negotiation and conclusion of EU 
FTAs, often praised for having enhanced the democratic quality of EU external trade. Yet an 
FTA does not stop at its entry into force. Implementation is a crucial phase in its life-cycle.167 
The lack of parliamentary say during the implementation of an FTA goes to the detriment of 
the dual source of EU democratic legitimacy.168 Furthermore, an enhanced role during trade 
negotiations means the EP will be held responsible to meet its constituencies’ expectations.169 
The EP is the only institution that could exercise political control and have a formal say in the 
process of decision-making, but from which it is yet excluded, both at the EU and bilateral 
level. An additional layer to this would be judicial review by the CJEU, which can exercise ex-
post scrutiny over decisions of EU FTAs bodies, which are subject to its jurisdiction as legal 
acts adopted within the frame of EU legal acts, i.e. EU FTAs.170 Yet this would only be ancillary 
to an institutional architecture that should incorporate safeguards to create a sort of ‘harm-
proof’ institutional environment in the first place.171  
 
5. Designing an Institutional Architecture for Fundamental Rights 
The analysis of the institutional design of EU FTAs informs as to the extent to which the 
institutional architecture of EU FTAs is adequate to safeguard and promote fundamental 
rights. Following the theoretical framework, and with a view to understanding the implications 
of a certain institutional design for the outcome, in this case fundamental rights, this paper has 
focused on the mandate of the treaty bodies and on the interactions and accountability 
mechanisms of the decision-making processes. A series of limitations have been found, which 
lead to believe that, with the exception of labour rights, the implementation of EU FTAs may 
easily overlook fundamental rights. Not only the preferences set up for the treaty bodies are 
narrow-sighted from a fundamental rights perspective - this may shape the preferences of the 
members of the institutions, how they understand their role, and eventually what they will 
discuss at their meetings. For the Joint Committees, this means they may neglect the 
                                               
166 Laura Puccio and Roderick Harte, ‘The European Parliament’s Role in Monitoring the Implementation of EU Trade Policy’ in 
Olivier Costa (ed), The European Parliament in Times of EU Crisis (Palgrave 2019). 
167 Patrick Leblond, ‘Making the Most of CETA: A Complete and Effective Implementation Is Key to Realizing the Agreement's 
Full Potential’ (2016) CIGI Papers No. 114, 30 October 2016. 
168 Weiss, ‘Delegation to treaty bodies in EU agreements’ (n 2) 552. 
169 Puccio and Harte (n 166). 
170 See Articles Art.218(11), 263, 267 TFEU. 
171 The paper is interested in what can be done before, within the framework of the institutional architecture of EU FTAs, rather  
than after. For a discussion on the limits of CJEU judicial review of trade agreements in matters of fundamental rights see 
Katarzyna Szepelak, Judicial Extraterritorial Application of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and EU Trade Relations – 
Where do we stand today?’ in Eva Kassoti and Ramses A Wessel (eds), EU Trade Agreements and the Duty to Respect 
Human Rights Abroad (CLEER PAPERS 2020/1). 
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relevance of fundamental rights of the decisions they take, because their role is to facilitate 
the implementation of the FTA; whereas for the DAGs and the CSF this means they may not 
discuss issues on fundamental rights other than labour rights. The analysis has shown that, 
even where such discussion may occur and the DAGs and the CSF be given the chance to 
present them to the decisional bodies, the rules for decisions-making defy monitoring and 
accountability mechanisms, vis-a-vis civil society as much as the EP. In this context, it is hard 
to see how fundamental rights will be the consequent policy outcome.  
First, regarding the gaps in the mandate, it is important that fundamental rights are embedded 
in the general objectives of the institutions, or in their specific tasks. Regarding the tasks of 
the institutions, it should be clear what their role would have to be in relation to fundamental 
rights. Above all, the mandates of the DAGs should include ongoing on-the-ground monitoring 
of the impact that the FTA may have on fundamental rights. Dedicated sessions during the 
CSF meetings should include exchanges on these issues and should result in concrete 
proposals to be advanced to Joint and Specialised committees. At the moment, the DAGs and 
CSF do not provide a platform with a clear mandate for monitoring fundamental rights. 
Implementation of EU FTAs is limited to what can be found therein. It remains at the discretion 
of the actors engaged in those bodies whether to add initiatives going beyond the scope of 
the FTAs. CETA shows that under best practices of transparency and regular exchanges with 
civil society, this could be possible. As discussed, however, it still has to be seen whether 
discussions will touch upon issues relating to fundamental rights, and whether they will reach 
the agenda of the decisional treaty bodies. Not only new initiatives for fundamental rights could 
come forward, but also policy space for deliberation could emerge.172 Importantly, the new 
treaty bodies that institutionalise the involvement of civil society are unique in their effect of 
enabling dialogue on a series of issues related to trade. Research has shown that horizontal 
dialogues between EU and partner countries’ civil society have great value in themselves.173 
EU trade union representatives, for instance, attach a lot of importance to maintaining a 
dialogue with the trade unions of the trade partner, because these are the ones who have the 
knowledge of the situation in those countries.174 The mandate of the DAGs and CSF should 
accordingly put more emphasis on exploring the normative relationships between trade and 
fundamental rights, so as to trigger discussions thereon and lead to new policy outcomes.  
                                               
172 The history of the European Union provides several useful examples of how new issues, legal competences and powers 
have come to be added to the initial, merely economic, project. See Alec Stone Sweet and others, ‘The Institutiona lization of 
European Space’, in Alec Stone Sweet and others (eds), The institutionalization of Europe (OUP 2001). 
173 Van Den Putte (n 118). 
174 Informal interview with EU trade union representative.  
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Second, the institutional structure of EU FTAs showcases the distributive effects of institutions. 
The EU is increasingly forcing and forging new entities that appear to streamline civil society 
participation, and also opening up venues for civil society actors to provide their views and 
opinions. Yet the DAGs and the CSF have been conceived above all as ad hoc advisory 
bodies. They remain much less formalised and on the margin than other treaty bodies for the 
implementation of EU FTAs. Their absence from the chapters on institutional provisions clearly 
hints at this. At the same time, the “institutional layering” - namely the addition, as opposed to 
the improvement, of the interactions with already existing institutions175 - has resulted in the 
creation of too many entities and mechanisms: they have overcrowded the institutional 
architecture of EU FTAs and “fatigued” participation by interested parties.176 DAGs have been 
created for each FTA, but the coordination, organisational and financial consequences only 
realised at a later stage.177 The Joint Committee for EUJEPA has recognised that “there exist 
many frameworks for policy dialogues” and recommended different bodies seek 
“synergies”.178  Members of the DAGs harshly criticise not being informed about proposals 
and their lack of involvement throughout the process.179 All this has arguably an impact on 
participation of those representing citizens.  
Most importantly, what emerges is a stark contrast between centralisation of decision-making 
powers by the Joint Committees and dispersion of decision-takers. When it comes to 
processes of decision-making, neither civil society or the EP have a say. They do not take part 
in the meetings of the Joint and Specialised Committees, but only interact with them in differing 
and confusing formats. As shown, the interactions between civil society and the committees 
are highly inconsistent and discretional across FTAs. Participation of civil society has been 
fragmented across several venues, exacerbating coordination to advance recommendations 
to other bodies.180 Chances for fundamental rights to be discussed would be enhanced by 
allowing the EP and civil society representatives to be present at the meetings of the treaty 
bodies. As to the EP, its gradual empowerment in external trade should be extended to the 
implementation stage, by providing it with a body or platform to engage. Arguably, to the extent 
that the EP and civil society actors were made formal members of those bodies, they could 
operate as a check on the work of executive bodies and provide a means of political control.  
                                               
175 Orfeo Fioretos, ‘Historical Institutionalism in International Relations’ (2011) 65 International Organization 367. 
176 Jan Orbie and others, ‘Promoting sustainable development or legitimising free trade? Civil society mechanisms in EU trade 
agreements’ (2017) Third World Thematics: A TWQ Journal; Diana Potjomkina, ‘Multistakeholderism in the EU’s Trade 
Governance’ (Institute for European Studies, Issue 2018/01, October 2018). 
177 European Commission, ‘Non-paper’ (n 86). 
178 First Meeting of the Joint Committee under EUJEPA, ‘Joint Minutes’, available at 
<https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2019/october/tradoc_158381.pdf>. 
179 See i.a. intervention by Lina Carr (ETUC) and Tanja Buzek (EESC) at Civil Society Forum November 2019. Video recording 
of the Forum provided by email and made available for one week by Andreas Tibbles, Trade Policy Officer, Trade Agreements 
Secretariat (TCT) Global Affairs Canada. The recording is not available online. 
180 Potjomkina (n 176). 
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A final point indeed concerns accountability mechanisms. The Joint Committees can take 
binding decisions, which may have implications for fundamental rights, without having to 
account to the EP or civil society.181 Even though civil society can interact with the Joint and 
Specialised Committees and submit views, no accountability mechanisms are in place 
requiring the Joint or Specialised committees to follow up on their comments or 
recommendations.182 Most problematic, it is not clear how issues raised would possibly be 
filtered and selected in the context of a multitude of insights. The most recent CETA CSF is a 
clear example of this. One can hardly conclude that the outcome of the deliberations will be 
translated into recommendations or other measures. The annex to the EU textual proposal for 
regulatory cooperation in TTIP on the institutional set up is illuminating in this respect: it 
identifies “political accountability”, “effective coordination” and “transparency” as essential 
elements for the institutional set-up of regulatory cooperation activities.183 It recognises that 
an institutional architecture requires some normative, “good governance” anchors. Attaching 
these principles to the institutional chapters of EU FTAs would enhance democratisation, as 
an ongoing endeavour;184 it would mean designing and institutionalising processes that are 
informed by aims of democratic governance, as opposed to policy effectiveness.185 In the light 
of no institutionalised democratic procedures for decision-making,186 the scholarship on Global 
Administrative Law could represent a useful benchmark that could be employed as 
overarching objectives for the institutional chapters and for decision-making processes: it 
provides mechanisms, practices and principles, such as transparency, participation, reasoned 
decision, legality and effective review of rules and decisions that could be applied to decision-
making processes.187 
The contribution of an institutional architecture to fundamental rights lies in creating institutions 
with a mandate to monitor and assess the impact on fundamental rights; in creating policy 
space for horizontal exchanges on local fundamental rights issues; and in creating an 
institutional environment where procedures for decision-makers are subject to accountability 
and monitoring mechanisms. An examination of the institutional architecture of the EU FTAs 
reveals a series of omissions that do not fulfil these needs. The design of the institutional 
architecture of the new generation EU FTAs lags behind in creating an institutional 
environment where fundamental rights can be protected. The present evaluation reveals that 
the EU is leading globally and has made huge steps when it comes to involving civil society 
at the implementation stage, but important gaps remain as to accountability and meaningful 
participatory mechanisms. It shows that the proliferation of treaty bodies for the 
implementation of EU FTAs has not equated with an institutional architecture that can 
adequately safeguard fundamental rights. 
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6. Conclusion  
Once a trade agreement is concluded, it is pivotal that the impact of its implementation on 
fundamental rights is monitored. It is also important that the institutional architecture creates 
an environment where its bodies are accountable and can deliberate and exchange views on 
fundamental rights in the context of trade. Starting from the question of the extent to which the 
institutional architecture of EU FTAs is adequate to protect fundamental rights, this paper has 
highlighted some of the main shortcomings of the institutional architecture of the new 
generation FTAs from a fundamental rights perspective. The results of the study lead to 
foresee little consideration of fundamental rights at the implementation stage. Historical 
institutionalism tells us that institutional design matters, for it affects the outcome. Rules for 
how institutions are to operate define the preferences of the members of the institutions and 
the interactions among them. Institutions will have distributional effects, which will be reflected 
in decisions-making processes. Historical institutionalism also tells us that it will be difficult for 
institutions to depart from certain practices once they are undertaken. The picture that 
emerges from the analysis of the institutional design of EU FTAs bodies at first sight suggests 
a departure from past practices where only Joint and Specialised Committees were created. 
In fact, when looking at what the new bodies are for and how they are to interact with the 
decision-making bodies, it may be said that the picture is one of two steps forward and three 
steps backwards. The institutional design falls short of creating an institutional architecture 
that can adequately protect fundamental rights or enable deliberation in their respect. 
The mandate of the DAGs and CSF is defined by the Parties to the agreement and can be 
said to reflect their preferences. There remain several gaps in what they can monitor and 
influence. Substantively, labour rights are the only set of rights to be the object of their 
monitoring. Procedurally, they have limited tools to monitor the work of the Joint and 
Specialised Committees. Deficiencies in decision-making processes and distributive effects 
are evident in the fact that the DAGs and the CSF remain consultative bodies; that they enjoy 
only discretional interaction with the Joint Committee; and that there are no follow-up 
mechanisms whereby they would know whether and how their views were taken into account. 
The layering and copy-pasting of treaty bodies across different FTAs shows that inefficient 
path-dependencies are already visible. As to the EP, the analysis has shown that it has no 
place in treaty bodies, nor has it a treaty body for itself. Its involvement could have accounted 
for political scrutiny, so that the implementation of FTAs is responsive to citizens’ preferences 
and safeguards their fundamental rights. The institutional architecture of EU FTAs could have 
institutionalised the involvement of the EP, alongside the creation of bodies for civil society, 
so as to reflect their demands to have a say and ensure that the efforts at democratising EU 
external trade do not stop at the negotiation stage.  
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